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THE AUTHORITY OF THE COURT
The first half century of the juvenile court movement in the United
States has seen the extension of juvenile court laws to all of the states.
This progress has been noted with a general feeling of great achieve-
ment in the national acceptance of an idea which has become an integral
part of the community's program for the protection of special groups
of children.' The acclaim given this historic development has not been
unmixed with acknowledgment that much remains to be accomplished
for the ideal standards of the court to be realized. Under the challeng-
ing title, "Most Courts Have to Be Substandardl", Lowell Julliard
Carr writes that outside of the 200-odd "big city" counties (counties
with cities of 50,000 or over) "the juvenile court in its dealings with
children is actually a kind of legal fiction. It has the name, it has a pre-
siding officer-probate judge, common pleas clerk, or what-have-you-
chosen without regard to his understanding of children. It has sundry
sketchy documents called case records, compiled, of course, without
benefit of any trained caseworkers, and sometimes not even compiled."'2
The challenge is one that many communities are striving to meet,
recognizing the need for specially qualified judges, competent, trained
probation staffs, and necessary related facilities. The materials of the
court are needed and are being sought. Meanwhile, and indeed, partic-
ularly while these inadequacies exist, is the work of philosophical and
legal creation complete? Probably not. That there is a continuing prob-
lem of legal creation is the significance of the periodic, even frequent,
revisions of the Standard Juvenile Court Act.3 And the fact that most
of the state legislatures have been slow and backward to modernize
their juvenile court laws has its own meaning. Katharine F. Lenroot,
1. For example, FEDERAL PROBATION, September 1949, ".4 Special Issue Commemoratitig
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Juvenile Court."
2. Ibid. See also his book, DELINQUENCY CONTROL, Harper & Brothers, 1950, pp. 234-240.
3. Five editions, 1925 to 1949. Published by the National Probation and Parole Asso-
ciation.
SL RUBIN
then Chief of the United States Children's Bureau, pointed out several
areas in which there is today a marked difference of opinion, or need
for further exploration-the jurisdiction of the court, the geographic
area served by the court, whether the court is (or should be) a legal
or social agency, the relationship between the court and administrative
social welfare agencies, the relationship between the court and the
police.4 Carr puts it another way, emphasizing the court's protective
role: "How realize the values implicit in socialized procedures, on the
one hand, provide needed legal protections for the child, on the other,
and at the same time avoid the red tape and superficial procedures con-
nected with traditional methods?"
What should be the direction of further legal development? The
motivation and justification of the court is that it is a superior agency
for the protection of children, specifically, superior, for children, to a
criminal court and its criminal procedure. On behalf of this purpose
a great deal of power has been given to the court which in itself has
raised problems. It is not enough to say-"The more power to the
court, the better it can deal with the problems brought to it." We must
stop to consider that the power of the juvenile court is over the child,
for the most part, rather than over the things affecting the child. We
may exercise that power to protect the community against the child,
at times, as we do with adult criminals. The court is justified, how-
ever, not so much as an agency with authority over the child, but as an
agency which has been given authority in order to carry out its responsi-
bility to protect the child. This protective role is in fact the constitu-
tional basis of the juvenile court. The juvenile court disposition is
non-criminal-the court exists to protect the child from the condemna-
tion of a criminal conviction. Constitutionally the juvenile court law
stands or falls turning on whether the child within the jurisdiction of
the court may be punished as a criminal. If he may, the court is a
criminal court and the rights of defendants in a criminal court must be
applied.
The proceeding, the statutes declare, is to be entitled not against the
child, but on behalf of the child.5 But we do not pretend that the con-
stitutional validity of the court and its social validity are one and the
same. We have as illustrations the many courts in the smaller areas, as
Carr points out; and, in fact, some courts in the larger cities.
The increased flexibility of the court, its informality, have been
4. FEDERAL PROBATION, Op. Cit.
5. The Standard Ju'venile Court .ct, section 11, provides, "The Petition and all sub-
sequent court documents shall be entitled 'In the interest of ...................... , a child
under eighteen years of age.'"
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achieved principally by the sacrifice for the child of rights which a
defendant in a criminal court has. It becomes doubly necessary, there-
fore, to protect the child from abuse of the authority of the court itself.
Roscoe Pound writes, "Child placement involves administrative author-
ity over one of the most intimate and cherished of human relations.
The powers of the Star Chamber were a trifle in comparison with those
of our juvenile courts and courts of domestic relations. . . .It is well
known that too often the placing of a child in a home or even in an
institution is done casually or perfunctorily, or even arbitrarily ...
Even with the most superior personnel, these tribunals call for legal
checks."6
The problem of further legal development perhaps includes, then, the
seeking of the best means of protecting the child in the juvenile court.
Perhaps the work of legal creation is not complete with the grant of
authority to the courts. The power of the court must be examined; is
it in fact the best protection to the child, or are limitations to be sought,
which would provide a better protection? Can this protection be pro-
vided without obstructing the treatment process of the court, which is
also a protection to the child?
With these considerations we examine the jurisdiction of the court,
detention of children before the court, the procedure, and finally the
treatment process, to point out existing provisions which require stress-
ing, and to suggest others which would provide additional protection
to the child in the juvenile court.
JURISDICTION
The basic jurisdiction of juvenile courts is a taking over of cases
which would otherwise belong to the criminal court. We shall turn
to this presently. Meanwhile we find that the jurisdiction of the juvenile
court has become much broader than this, to include cases of depend-
ency (in some courts) and neglect (in almost all courts). Here we
find dangers to be guarded against. The child who is neglected or
dependent has done nothing requiring judicial action, nor does his con-
dition require any more than the providing of aid. Yet courts whose
jurisdiction includes dependency and neglect are given legal authoriza-
tion to commit such children to the same training schools to which
delinquent children are committed, subject to release in the same manner
as delinquents. Neglected and even dependent children are to be found
in our training schools, in small numbers, to be sure.
6. Foreword to SOCIAL TREATMENT IN PROBATION AND DELINQUENCY; PAULINE V. YOUNG,
McGraw-Hill Book Co. Inc., 1952. Our emphasis.
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Can legal protection to the child be provided to guard against abuse
of dependency and neglect jurisdiction? The 1949 revision of the
Standard Juvenile Court Act moved specifically against dependency
jurisdiction in juvenile courts. In contrast to earlier editions of the
act, the 1949 revision recommends that dependency jurisdiction should
not be given to the juvenile court. The explanatory comment to the
jurisdiction section reads: "It is generally agreed that the court should
intervene only when there is need of authoritative action with respect
to a child or the adults responsible for his care or condition. Cases of
dependency without an element of neglect, or where no change of legal
custody is involved, should be dealt with by administrative agencies
without court action." Probably there is little disagreement concerning
the position of the Standard Act on dependency, but many acts include
this jurisdiction.
Neglect jurisdiction too requires close examination. In some juvenile
court acts, no legal distinction whatever is made as between the dispo-
sitions available for delinquent and neglected children. This is true in
those jurisdictions which, like the Standard Act, principally to avoid
the stigma of a delinquency adjudication, do not attach the terms
"delinquency" or "neglect" to the different categories of jurisdiction.
It is also true in jurisdictions which, although using the terms "delin-
quent," "neglected" and "dependent," authorize all the same types of
disposition for any case.
Perhaps the simplest protection to the neglected child in juvenile
court would be to exclude training school commitments from disposi-
tions available in such cases. This is done in some acts by simply author-
izing training school commitments for delinquent children, and not for
neglected children. It can also be done in acts which do not use the
labels "delinquent" or "neglected" by nevertheless limiting the types
of disposition as to the cases which are in fact neglect cases without
being so tagged.
The justification for taking jurisdiction in neglect cases is that author-
itarian judicial action is needed against a culpable parent or other cus-
todian. The fact is, however, that the juvenile court proceedings in
neglect cases are not against parents, but the children themselves are
subject to the order of the court, are subject to probation and commit-
ment. The legal necessity for this is that the neglectful parent may be
deprived of custody over the child. Nevertheless the authority goes
to the child when he is committed or placed away from home, rather
than to the parent. And when probation is used, often the legal form
is placing the child on probation.
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The problem is to avoid action against the child while still -inter-
vening to overcome the neglect. Action may be needed to coerce the
parent to cease his neglect. In such a case should not the order run
against the parents? Most juvenile court laws do not so provide, except
in prosecutions against parents under "contributing to delinquency and
neglect" statutes, 7 and direct actions against parents to enforce
support."
The Standard Juvenile Court Act suggests the following: "In sup-
port of any order or decree the court may require the parents or other
persons having the custody of the child, or any other person who has
been found by the court to be encouraging, causing or contributing to
the acts or conditions which bring the child within the purview of this
act, to do or omit to do any acts required or forbidden by law, when
the judge deems such requirement necessary for the welfare of the
child. In case of failure to comply with such requirement, the court
may proceed against such persons for contempt of court."9
But the action against the parent may be ineffective or inadequate.
Often the court must see that care is provided by other than parental
means. What power does the court have in such cases? In neglect
cases judges often have a feeling of helplessness because the tools of
the court-authority and casework-are not the solution. Facilities are
needed, placement facilities, or assistance of one kind or another for
the family, and the community may not have them. The judge's only
recourse is to do what he can with the family and perhaps console him-
self with the thought that the legal definition of neglect is ultimately
governed by what support the community gives to families in trouble-
the juvenile court law standard of neglect cannot be on a much higher
plane than community facilities. It is no triumph for the court to sub-
stitute court neglect, or community neglect, for parental neglect.' 0
7. Such proceedings have their own difficulties, particularly that the criminal proceeding
would be a duplication of the neglect proceeding; there are other difficulties. The merit of
the proceeding itself is doubtful; see PAUL W. ALEXANDER, Jhats This About Punishing
Parents? FEDERAL PROBATION, March 1948.
8. Standard Act, section 21.
9. Section 18 (4). The 1951 Georgia juvenile court act and the 1952 Kentucky act
adopted this provision. The New York City Domestic Relations Court Act has such a
provision applicable in neglect cases.
10. See, for an illustration, Simple A1rithmetic About Complex Children: A9 Study of
Temporary Shelter for Dependent and Neglected Children in Neqv York City, by BERTRAM
M. BECK, (Community Service Society of New York, 1952). ii. "Only a minority of the
children for whom shelter is sought are placed in shelter on the day for which it is sought.
* Others must wait from one day to more than two weeks before being admitted to
shelter. . . . The delay means that they must stay in situations to which they may be
accustomed but which are less than desirable. For still others the delay means that they
must stay in homes in which they receive inadequate physical care or in which they are
in grave moral danger . . . And for some children a placement cannot be found at
all." 61. "The court workers point to an unknown number of cases in which shelter is
1952]
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If the community does not have the means of curing the neglect of the
child, and the court tools are merely those of coercion and casework for
the parents, the court is frequently faced with the choice of becoming
a punitive agency or returning the child to an unsatisfactory home. In
either way the neglect is not cured; in either case the neglect jurisdic-
tion is not useful. If the community does have the means of curing
the neglect, organization of its facilities on a welfare basis should
enable the court neglect-jurisdiction to fall into relative disuse. Per-
haps we should have in mind also that, as Dorothy Hutchinson com-
mented, "Sometimes the neglect is one that offends the community
more than it hurts the child."'
It is particularly neglect and dependency jurisdiction that more and
more in recent years brings criticism upon the role of the juvenile
court. Martha Branscombe, for example, points out that "at the time
the juvenile court idea was developed, the only public administrative
agent was the poor relief official. It is, therefore, understandable
historically that the courts became one of the first specialized public
services for children." But "in the past three decades, the develop-
ment of public child welfare services throughout the country, together
with the recognition of the inherent limitations of the court as a case-
work agency, have given rise to difficult jurisdictional questions. Today,
however, it is essential to recognize the principle establishment by our
tradition that distinguishes between judicial functions, which are the
responsibility of courts of competent jurisdiction, and those of an
administrative nature, which must be performed by an appropriate
administrative agency. It is clear that legal questions relevant to com-
pulsory commitment or removal of the child from his parents, and
those affecting the status of the child, must be decided by a court. In
the light of our experience, however, we should not continue to expect
the court to decide what should be done beyond resolving the legal
problem, or to provide the service for the child requiring not legal
but social services or other treatment."'
not requested, although it is needed, simply because the Justices and the probation workers
have had experience during that given day indicating that shelter will not be available."
One of the unique features of the shelter program in New York City is that a large part
of the bed capacity is provided by private agencies over which public officials have only
limited control.
11. "The Parent-Child Relationship as a Factor in Child Placement," THE FAMILY,
April 1946.
12. Basic Policies and Principles of Public Child Care Services-An Underlying Phi-
losophy, CHILD WELFARE, February 1952. Similar comment is made by George B. Mangold
in Problems of Child Welfare (The Macmillian Co., 1936; p. 49)-"since the treatment
of neglect and cruelty is largely a casework problem, it may be desirable, if possible, to
reverse the present tendencies and to invest in other public departments, such as county
boards of public or child welfare, the duty of child protection. Gradually states are granting
[Vol. 49
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Two studies of truancy 13 and the court may be used as illustrations,
one in which the court jurisdiction was used, one in which it was avoided
by the use instead of highly developed administrative facilities. A
study by Herbert A. Landry of the effect of court process on attendance
rates indicates that "for the great majority of children, court action
does not seem to accomplish the purposes for which it was estab-
lished."14 Landry concluded that the attack on the truancy problem
should emphasize prior responsibility in the school. The second study
is a report of remarkable success by a school system (Gary, Indiana)
which accepted this prior responsibility. Mark Roser reports that an
experimental group of chronic truants, children with poor attendance
records, and children with serious behavior problems, were placed in
small classes, held for only half time, and emphasis was placed upon
giving them a feeling of some success each day. The setting of the
separate school centers was made as permissive as possible; casework
counseling was provided for the parents. After two years truancy in
this group completely disappeared. At the present time, Roser states,
"The Gary school system does not use the juvenile court for problems
of truancy. As facilities have been increased and trained staff made
available, referral of truants to the juvenile -court has been reduced
from an average of 350 cases per year out of an enrollment of 23,000,
to zero. ... Insofar as we can determine, the rates of school attendance
have not been lowered."':
Such views and experience may foretell a decline in the use of neglect
jurisdiction by juvenile courts, but not its disappearance, since court
authority is needed where neglect is such that change in custody is
necessary. The statutory form of this limited neglect jurisdiction would
be to confine it to cases where change in custody is alleged to be neces-
sary for the welfare of the child.16
wide powers to such local units, and since they are administrative and executive rather
than judicial, they are theoretically the most logical agencies for this form of service. The
White House conference suggests that the juvenile court relinquish the care and protec-
tion of neglected childlren and that public units, such as boards of children's guardians on
a city-wide or county-wide basis, absorb this function."
13. Truancy as juvenile court jurisdiction is better defined as neglect than delinquency.
The Standard Juvenile Court A4ct gives truancy jurisdiction in the following words-It
gives jurisdiction over any child "who is neglected as to proper or necessary support or
education as required by law ... "
14. The Prosecution of School Non-Attendants; quoted in CHILDREN ABSENT FROM SCHOOL,
Citizen's Committee on Children of New York City, Inc., 1949, p. 68. Dr. Landry's study
is described as the "first compilation of objective data as to the effect of the court
process on attendance rates, school adjustment and social adjustment."
15. The Role of the Schools in Heading Off Delinquency, YEARBOOK, National Probation
and Parole Association, 1951.
16. Court jurisdiction over neglected children is by no means an innovation of juvenile
court laws. For many years, for much of our national history, in fact, courts have had
such jurisdiction. See THE CARE OF DESTITUTE, NEGLECTED AND DELINQUENT CHILDREN, by
1952]
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We return to delinquency jurisdiction. We note first that some delin-
quency definitions, including such things as waywardness (being beyond
the control of parent or guardian), have the effect not of taking chil-
dren out of the criminal court, but of bringing into the juvenile court
children who should not be in any court. This jurisdiction is not ex-
plained by the purpose of providing a more sympathetic, less punitive
forum than the criminal court for children who would otherwise be
tried criminally. Probably it can be explained only on the basis of the
court as a preventive or protective agency. It is a survival of ancient,
and archaic, provisions. Judicial authority for such activity, like depend-
ency and neglect jurisdiction, can be questioned.
Conversely, many juvenile court laws leave large loopholes, per-
mitting criminal prosecutions of children. For example, some juvenile
courts are excluded from taking jurisdiction where certain felonies
are involved; others permit the criminal court to take jurisdiction;
others provide for transfer of cases from juvenile court at the discre-
tion of the juvenile court judge. The Standard Act excepts only, at the
discretion of the juvenile court judge, cases of felonies committed by
children 16 and over.
This provision also establishes the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile
court, one of the most basic elements in the Standard Juvenile Court
Act. To the degree that a court's exclusive jurisdiction is compromised,
and exceptions exist, it is not protecting certain classes of children from
criminal procedure. In addition, a danger in the existence of concurrent
jurisdiction in juvenile and criminal court is that instead of the juvenile
court being a refuge for the child, it becomes, with its lesser evidentiary
rules, its dropping of constitutional safeguards of the defendant, the
recourse of a weak case. A California court recently wrote of the need
to "reduce the number of occasions when for lack of evidence to convict
in a criminal court, cases acknowledged to be unfit for juvenile court
procedure have, nevertheless, been retained in juvenile court, or on
being remanded to the criminal court have been dismissed for lack of
evidence. '" 7
DETENTION
The breadth of juvenile court jurisdiction has important conse-
quences, and must be considered in connection with other aspects of
HOMER FOLKS (The Macmillan Co., 1902), particularly chapters VIII--"The Boarding-
Out and Placing-Out System," and IX---"'Laws and Societies for the Rescue of Neglected
Children." This jurisdiction was a concomitant of inadequate care by the community. It
will be a mark of growth, of maturity in caring for children, if neglected children can be
taken care of without court authority, except where a change in custody is necessary.
17. Knight v. Superior Court of Tehama County, 102 Cal. App. 211, 1951.
[Vol. 45432
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juvenile court functioning. Along with the purpose of removing chil-
dren from the criminal courts by means of the juvenile court, has been
the effort to remove from the jails, the most notoriously inadequate
of our penal institutions, children who are before these courts.
The goal is to prevent any such children from being incarcerated in
jails. The Standard Juvenile Court Act therefore provides that "No
child shall at any time be detained in any police station, lockup, jail
or prison; except that, by order of the judge in which the reasons there-
for shall be specified, a child sixteen years of age or older whose con-
duct or condition is such as to endanger his safety or welfare or that of
others in the detention facility for children, may be placed in a jail
or other place of detention for adults, but in a room or ward entirely
separate from adults confined therein."
Several detention realities may be noted. First, there is a substantial
use of jails for children before the juvenile court. United States Chil-
dren's Bureau figures for 1946-1949 show that twenty-five percent of
the delinquency cases of children reported as being detained overnight
or longer were detained in jails.'8 This is probably an understatement.
Much of this jail detention is, incidentally, in violation of juvenile
court law.
Second, there may be excessive use of detention facilities other than
jail, and frequently these are no great improvement over jails, having
no diagnostic or treatment service, being custodial merely, and some-
times being run in a punitive and brutal fashion. Again using the
Children's Bureau data for 1946-1949, of the 64,772 delinquency cases
for which information on detention care was reported, detention was
ordered in 21,697 of the cases, or one-third.
Furthermore, it must be recalled that detention is used in neglect
and even dependency cases also, cases in which under no circumstances-
without the juvenile court law-would the child be detained in a jail.
These children in detention are housed with children with delinquency
patterns. And having in mind the broad delinquency definitions, it may
be observed that many children are detained as delinquents who would
never-without the juvenile court law-be detained in a jail. These
are the children whose delinquency is based on behavior or circum-
stances other than violation of a criminal law.
These considerations are especially significant inasmuch as children
detained by juvenile court, in most jurisdictions, do not have, as does
a defendant in a criminal court, the right to release on bail. This is
18. Juvenile Court Statistics 1946-1949, Children's Bureau Statistical Series No. 8, 1951.
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because the right to bail is an accompaniment of criminal court pro-
cedure. It is, however, a right of the criminal defendant. In eliminat-
ing it as a right of the child in juvenile court, we are obligated to pro-
tect the child from unnecessary detention, and from detention in inade-
quate and improper facilities.
In complying with this obligation we must rely on the facilities
afforded, the policy of the law, and the policy of the court. As we
have noted, the Standard Act, and many juvenile court laws, prohibit
jail detention. That the law is often violated is an attribute of a failure
to provide suitable other facilities, as well as a policy of over-detention
by the courts. Standards of detention facilities and court policy are
available.
Probably the most important control would come from jurisdiction.
Eliminating dependency jurisdiction (as the Standard Act does) elim-
inates dependent children from the detention homes. So far as the child
is concerned, a neglected child is no different from a dependent child.
Why then should not the juvenile court laws prohibit detention of neg-
lected children? Their care is a shelter problem-a welfare respon-
sibility-not a detention problem, not a problem of custody, not a court
problem.19 Delinquency jurisdiction too may be more limited than it
generally is today;20 and these limitations would automatically limit
detention.
Detention of children occurs not only in jails or other detention
facilities. It occurs also, as it does with adults, at the hands of the
police. The Standard Juvenile Court Act contains a provision similar
to that applicable to adults arrested; it is provided that a child not
released to parent or custodian shall be taken "without unnecessary
delay" to the court or to the place of detention designated by the court.
The provision is not, of course, self-operative. The latest edition
(1949) of the Standard Act proposes a new procedure by which police
handling of juveniles may be regularized. This protective provision
reads: "When any child found violating any law or ordinance, or whose
surroundings are such as to endanger his welfare, is taken into custody,
such taking into custody shall not be termed an arrest. The jurisdiction
of the court shall attach from the time of such taking into custody."21
The purpose of the provision is to authorize the court by general regu-
19. The Detention of Children in Michigan, SHERWOOD NORMAN (National Probation
and Parole Association, 1952) page 17.




lation, and in individual cases, to supervise police detention of
juveniles. 22
PROCEDURE
The characteristic procedural tool in a juvenile court is its in-
formality, in contrast to the highly developed formalities of a criminal
court. The criminal court trial is public, governed by strict rules of
evidence and procedure, and attended by a number of constitutional
limitations and requirements; whereas the juvenile court proceeding
is private, informal and free of limitations on its procedure.
The merit of informal juvenile court procedure is that it is gentler
in its impact on the people in the court, less dramatic, less threatening.
It replaces a public trial which is heavily laden with authoritative indi-
viduals as well as authoritative law. At the same time, however, the
informality is achieved at the expense of a formality which is also pro-
tective. The juvenile court has the responsibility of using its informality
as a protective device, to compensate for the loss of the procedural
protections given to the defendant in the criminal court.
The most markedly informal procedure in juvenile court is the prac-
tice, now being used in about half of the cases, on a national average,
of disposing of cases without the filing of a petition, and hence without
a hearing before the court and without an official juvenile court dispo-
sition being recorded. The power has been derived, as a legal matter,
from the authority given to almost all juvenile courts to make an inquiry
prior to the preparation of a petition, to determine (in the language
of the Standard Juvenile Court Act) "whether the interests of the public
or of the child require that further action be taken." Thereupon "the
court may make such informal adjustment as is practicable without a
petition, or may authorize a petition to be filed."
As a method of treatment, the "unofficial" procedure reflects a desire
to achieve a voluntary atmosphere. The responsibility of the court is
to see to it that the informal procedure does not become a cloak for
actions which would be improper or which would not be taken if the
case were before the court on a petition. Probably the first caution for
the court is to be fully cognizant of the fact that there exists a clear
legal limitation upon the use of unofficial casework. It must be re-
membered that an unofficial case, like an official case, is authorized
22. None of the states have such a provision in their laws; the Hawaii juvenile court
law, antedating the recommendation of the Standard Act, provides, "The judges of juvenile
courts shall make such rules and set up such standards of investigation as they consider




only when the child is in fact within the jurisdictional purview of the
juvenile court act.
Referring back to the statutory source of unofficial casework, we
note that the preliminary inquiry and the unofficial adjustment may
follow only when the court is informed that a child is within the pur-
view of the act. In other words, unofficial casework is legal only if the
information presented to the court is such that if verified, the filing of
a petition could follow. The juvenile court is not given carte blanche
to delve into any problem affecting children and families which comes
to its attention. In its unofficial casework, as in its cases brought to pe-
tition, the court must find its authority in the jurisdiction section of the
juvenile court law. 23
Since the unofficial casework is voluntary, the investigation must be
made without coercion. Without a petition there is no authority to re-
quire the appearance of any individual. Perhaps more difficult is the
problem of developing casework standards in unofficial proceedings.
What are sound criteria for unofficial cases; what precautions are
necessary to guard against coercion in the voluntary relationship? Some
courts have produced written criteria for unofficial cases (for example,
the Connecticut State Juvenile Court, and the New York City Chil-
dren's Court), but a greater elaboration and justification of the prac-
tices in use seems called for.
In some courts it is the practice to consider that the legal authority
for unofficial casework is at the same time legal authority for deten-
tion pending efforts at informal dispositions without petition. This is
a highly dubious procedure. Of course detention conflicts with the vol-
untary setting of unofficial work. But "unofficial" detention is dubious
from a legal point of view. Detention is derived not from the section
authorizing unofficial procedures, but from the section on detention. It
is clear from a reading of the detention provisions of the juvenile court
laws, and it must be so in any event, that detention of juveniles, whether
in the custody of an officer or of a detention home, is an exercise of legal
authority which must be reviewed by the court promptly and which
can be continued for only a minimum period of time without the filing
of a petition. Unofficial casework seems clearly to be excluded where a
child is in custody.
Informality characterizes the procedure of the "official" juvenile
23. PAUL W. TAPPAN has pointed out this danger in the use of unofficial proceedings.
See his book, JUVENILE DELINQUENCY (McGraw-Hill Book Co.), pages 202-203. This book,
probably more than any other recent writing on the subject, displays a concern regarding
the extent of juvenile court jurisdiction, and its extremely flexible procedure.
[Vol. 43
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court cases (those in which a petition is filed) as well as the unofficial
cases. The probation officer is permitted to study the child and his
background before the child has been adjudicated (whereas in a criminal
case, in the trial of an adult, such a study can be made only after a
finding of guilt). Attorneys in court (the exception rather than the
rule) can not put up as aggressive a defense as in a criminal case. Of
course the legal justification for this is that the consequences of adjudi-
cation are noncriminal, and there is no accusation of the child.
On the other hand the consequences of adjudication are serious, and
basic rules of evidence are applicable in juvenile court cases as safe-
guards to reliability of information. If a finding may be based on a less
rigid requirement than proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the test in a
criminal case, there must still be a preponderance of the evidence, as in
a civil case; while the probation officer may make a social investigation
to guide the court in disposition, findings of fact for adjudication must
still be based on direct evidence and not on hearsay. 2
TREATMENT
We have observed that the constitutional basis for upholding the
juvenile court laws is that they are noncriminal; adjudication in a
juvenile court is not, legally, a conviction for crime. Of course it is
recognized that the practical application of a criminal conviction comes
in the form of community rejection-denial of employment, denial of
the right to serve in the armed forces, and social rejection in various
forms. In these respects the juvenile delinquent is, in fact, often treated
as a criminal, just as a "record" of juvenile delinquency is included in
a presentence investigation for crime, although it is not considered a('conviction" in relation to increased penalties for repeated offenders.
The "noncriminal" nature of the juvenile court adjudication is, then,
a reality in some respects, and in others it is quite similar to a criminal
conviction.
The destructive attitudes of the community here indicated are a
problem which the juvenile court has in common with the entire cor-
rectional field, and its personnel join in efforts at community education
to overcome these limitations on readjustment of offenders. Are there
also legal attributes in the treatment of juveniles which require separate
consideration?
What of the form of commitment? The child committed by a
juvenile court is, in every case, committed for the duration of his minor-
24. In the Matter of Arthur Lewis, 260 N.Y. 171.
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ity. Potentially, this means that the younger the offender, the longer
the possible term of his commitment. The committed seven year old
could theoretically be committed for 14 years; the committed seventeen
year old, close to his eighteenth birthday, can not be committed for over
three years. That the suggested logical absurdity is seldom encountered
in fact is not a reason for the existence of this situation; it is a reason
for changing it. But very likely the indeterminate juvenile commitments
do have their effects. Why should not, then, three years be the maximum
term of commitment for adjudicated juvenile delinquents as in the
English juvenile court system ?25 Children in United States institutions
for delinquents who remain for three years or more probably run to
five percent of all commitments. In terms of psychological develop-
ment, in terms of relative punishment, is not a year of a child's com-
mitment more severe than a year in the commitment of an adult?
The universal commitment-for-minority has another effect. Fre-
quently children remain under the jurisdiction of the training schools
until they attain their majority, no matter what their age when released.
Consequently the length of time on parole depends upon the age at
which they were placed on parole. The combined commitment and
parole time of the older adolescent may be three to four years; for
the younger delinquent, it is longer, often much longer. Such an out-
come is not merely inconsistent; it is burdensome on the treatment
facilities for children, and may be detrimental to treatment.
If in fact this is an unsatisfactory situation, the suggested limitation
on commitment of juvenile delinquents is a possible improvement. Per-
haps there should also be considered giving the juvenile court judge
the responsibility of fixing the period of commitment, within such a
limit. A recent study by Robert E. Coulsen led him to the following:
"In discussing the training schools with the children from our county
who have been committed to them, a few general reactions have been
developed. For one, they are not outraged or made vengeful by
moderate physical chastisement. . . .Without exception the graduates
said that they preferred taking a beating to losing a privilege. Their
greatest complaints of injustice or mistreatment relate to the fixing of
times for discharge. This attitude also is widespread among the adults
who have spent time in penitentiaries or reformatories.
26
25. The English juvenile courts may commit a child to an approved school for a period
of three years or if under twelve until the age of fifteen. See Children's Court in England,
BASIL L. Q. HENRIQUE, JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW AND CRIMINOLOGY, November-December
1946.
26. Evaluation of Institutional Experience, AMERICAN PRISON ASSOCIAnON PROCEEDINGS,
1948. Italics added. And the comment of Richard A. Chappell, regarding the federal
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There is one situation in which the "non-criminality" of the juvenile
court disposition becomes more fiction than fact. In a number of
jurisdictions it is possible for a child committed to a training school by
a juvenile court, to be thereafter transferred to a penal institution
without further court order. This means simply that a child can land
in a penal institution without an arraignment or trial.
'The Ohio juvenile court law provides that a child 16 years of age or
over may be committed to the reformatory if the basis of delinquency
is an act which would be a felony if committed by an adult. In an early
case,27 a boy committed under this provision sought release from the
reformatory. The court held that although the reformatory was a
prison for adults, it was only a place of reformation for children. What
this does is take the "noncriminal" phrase of the juvenile court law,
the phrase which declares it to be the policy that the juvenile court law
shall be noncriminal, as establishing that no matter what is done to
the child is noncriminal, no matter how apparent the clash with reality.28
As legal reasoning, it is dubious.
A similar outcome is possible, as to younger children as well, under
the laws of other states, and even where the act was not a violation
of a penal law. The proper concept would seem to be in the passage
quoted in a leading case on the constitutionality of juvenile court law:
"The basic conceptions which distinguish juvenile courts from other
courts can be briefly summarized. Children are to be dealt with sepa-
rately from adults. Their cases are to be heard at a different time, and
preferably in a different place; they are to be detained in separate build-
ings, and, if institutional guidance is necessary, they are to be committed
to institutions for children."29
juvenile delinquency law: "Some of the courts which follow the practice of committing
an offender for the period of his minority have been disappointed to learn that the juvenile
frequently serves a long sentence, before being granted parole. As a rule the parole board
is more likely to grant parole to a juvenile than to an adult, but if a long sentence is im-
posed originally and parole is violated, the juvenile may have to serve as much as five
to six years for an offense for which an adult may have been sentenced to r8 months
to two years. Therefore, in cases of juveniles who cannot be placed on probation, the
courts may wish to consider sentences for a definite period rather than for the minority
of the juvenile. If the welfare of the juvenile is the primary consideration it would
appear that a sentence of about 23/2 or three years is best, as this will provide for a year
and a half in an institution and a similar additional period for parole supervision following
institutional treatment." ("The Federal Probation Service," Federal Probation, December
1947.
27. Leonard v. Licker (1914), 23 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N.S.) 442.
28. The decision is criticized as going too far in upholding juvenile court legislation,
by BERNARD FLEXNER and REUBEN OPPENHEIMER, The Legal Alspect of the Juvenile Court,
U. S. Children's Bureau Publication No. 99, 1922, p. 9.




In plain sharp terms which well warrant repetition, Alan Keith Lucas
declared to the Midcentury White House Conference on Children and
Youth: "We are much more aware of the needs of children than we
used to be and much more concerned about them. But, although some
of us feel that we have some answers, actually there is far less agree-
ment than there was fifty years ago .... When, for instance, we advo-
cated juvenile courts around 1900, I think we were not concerned that
the personal opinion of a single official, however well-informed and speak-
ing with authority but with little or no well-tried legal procedures to keep
him within bounds, was a somewhat dubious way of deciding whether
a family should continue to exist. We were concerned perhaps if the
judge wasn't social-minded and didn't see things as we did, but the
idea that he might be taking away the parents' rights to their child,
or his rights to them, without any semblance of 'due process,' didn't
occur to us too often. We were too sure we knew what was right." 30
The concept of the juvenile court is a noble one-that the child should
not be punished for his acts or condition, but should be helped and pro-
tected. The law has been creative enough to have established this
special court with its purpose humanitarian rather than punitive. Ful-
fillment of this purpose has not yet been fully achieved. Creative law
can still make a contribution to means of protecting the child in trouble,
not only by taking him into this court, but by protecting him in the court.
It appears that important reorientations in jurisdiction may support
the protective role of the court. Existing legal provisions relating to
detention, procedure and disposition have given unusual powers to the
court. Are they in balance with provisions to protect the child and
parental rights? Improvement may well come from additional pro-
tective provisions, even if-perhaps because-they limit the power of
the court more than at present.
30. PROCEEDINGS; Health Publications Institute, Inc., Raleigh, N.C., p. 127.
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